A Lockheed Electra 10-E had been purchased for her in April 1936 by means of the Amelia Earhart Fund for Aeronautical Research, set up through Purdue University. Almost immediately there was a report that she planned to make a world flight. Miss Earhart denied having such plans, claiming that she would be too busy doing research for Purdue. Yet, early in June, her husband, George Palmer Putnam, the publisher, contacted Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and asked her to intercede with the State Department to obtain their help for the world flight. Putnam stressed that the plans were being kept confidential. Mrs. Roosevelt, through her secretary, contacted the State Department and Richard Southgate, the Chief of the Division of Protocol, was assigned to handle the matter. The Department contacted Putnam, but it was not until late September that discussions began on the flight.
Meanwhile the Electra had been delivered to Miss Earhart. In August, she flew the plane to Kansas City where, in an interview, she stated that she was undecided whether to enter the Bendix Air Race on 4 September. She did enter the race, but she did not win. Immediately afterward, she announced that she was planning a world flight following a route nearer to the equator than any previous world flight.
When Putnam finally approached the State Department, he was told that they could not act officially to obtain the needed foreign permissions until the flight had been approved by the Department of Commerce. Putnam wrote to the Commerce Department on 15 October asking approval of the flight, stating that the “primary purpose of the flight is a thorough field test of this two-motored plane with its various items of modern scientific equipment.” He gave a description of the plane and its equipment, specifically stating that it would not carry firearms or photographic equipment except for two small hand cameras.
The interesting portion of the letter was the description of the route to be followed. The first segment of the route ran from the West Coast to Honolulu and from there to India via either Manila or Tokyo. The Manila or Tokyo segment stands out from the remainder of the route, since the rest of the route was an equatorial route, while either of these segments would be well north of the equator. In addition, the Manila or Tokyo segments involved flying distances which were really beyond the safe range of her aircraft, for there were no land plane facilities available between Honolulu and either Manila or Tokyo.
Miss Earhart realized this problem and she approached the Navy at the end of October, asking for its cooperation in her flight by refueling her in the air over Midway Island. The Navy had taken her request under consideration. Believing that the Navy might need some prodding, Miss Earhart wrote to President Roosevelt and asked for his help in getting the Navy to cooperate. In outlining her proposed route to the President, she indicated that her primary route would be the one to Tokyo, but she substituted a new alternate route from Honolulu to Brisbane, Australia. The Brisbane route would seem even more dangerous than the Tokyo route, for it involved a flight of some 5,000 miles without the possibility of in-flight refueling. But the route would be possible if the government would prepare a landing field at Howland Island, some 1,700 miles southwest of Honolulu.
Howland, Baker, and Jarvis Islands had been colonized by the Commerce Department in March 1935. Aeronautical surveys had been made of the islands and, on Howland and Jarvis, areas had been marked out for development into runways. Plans had been drawn up to develop emergency airfields on these two islands and, when the Department of the Interior was given administrative control of the islands in May 1936, they prepared to carry the plans into operation. A statement appeared in the newspapers that construction equipment was to be sent to the islands in October 1936. This had not yet been done. Miss Earhart could have known about the airfield project from the beginning of her own planning, owing to the newspaper accounts. And, she would have known about the project from the Director of the Bureau of Air Commerce, Eugene Vidal, who was a personal friend of the Putnams. Vidal's Bureau had been responsible for the islands originally and still was concerned with aeronautical matters regarding the islands. The deviation from the equatorial route by using the Honolulu-Tokyo segment is understandable if one realizes that Howland was the key to the equatorial route and it had not been prepared by October 1936. Only the Tokyo or Manila route, depending on in-flight refueling, offered any alternative. But Howland might be prepared during the next provisioning cruise-every three months a Coast Guard cutter carried fresh supplies and replacement colonists to the islands-in January 1937. So Miss Earhart apparently was still hoping to carry through her equatorial route.
At the end of November, the Navy informed Miss Earhart that it would cooperate .in refueling her over Midway if she would pay for the gasoline and learn in-flight refueling techniques from a civilian source. At the same time, it appeared that the Howland emergency landing strip project was dead. Richard B. Black, the Interior Department's field representative at Honolulu and responsible for the islands-had requested at the beginning of November that he be authorized to obtain the equipment to begin the preparation of an emergency airfield on Jarvis Island. On 17 November, he was advised that there were no funds available "for purchase of tractors or employment engineers" and that he should try to arrange the loan of equipment "from Army Navy Territorial Public Works office or other source." At the end of November it was evident that, if she wanted to fly the Pacific, Miss Earhart would have to use in-flight refueling.
Then, on 2 December, Black radioed his superiors that he could borrow a tractor and an improvised scraper from the Army. Black reported that he had talked with Robert L. Campbell, the airport inspector of the Bureau of Air Commerce who was in Hawaii on an inspection tour, and Campbell had suggested that the Works Progress Administration (WPA) might be willing to underwrite the expenses of establishing an emergency airfield on Jarvis Island. Black asked for instructions.
On 4 December, while Black was still waiting for an answer, George Putnam informed the State Department that ''it had now been decided to change the route from the Hawaiian Islands to Allahabad, India as follows: Hawaiian Islands-Howland Island-Brisbane, Australia-Port Darwin, Australia" with an alternate route running from Howland Island to Port Moresby or Lae, New Guinea, and then to Port Darwin. On 7 December, Black was informed of the "proposed airplane landing field to be located Howland instead of Jarvis. Miller consulting Aubrey Williams Works Progress Administration and will propose that Howland landing field be designated WPA project."
Eugene Vidal radioed Robert Campbell on 8 December that he had seen Black's radiogram concerning the tractor and Vidal instructed Campbell to try to borrow a tractor with spare parts or two similar tractors plus a scraper and a grader from the "Army Navy Federal or Territorial Government" to be used to construct runways at Howland Island. Campbell was to go to Howland on the next provisioning cruise to supervise the work and he was cautioned not to release any information on the project. A short time later a follow-up letter arrived for Campbell filling him in on the situation. Amelia Earhart planned to use Howland as a refueling stop and, since she was " ... including Howland as one of her stops, it enables the Government to give immediate consideration to previous plans and to expedite the construction of a landing area on the Island which will be available to the flying public." Campbell was now ordered to stay on the island after construction had been finished until Miss Earhart had used the field in March and then he was to return to Honolulu with all equipment and personnel.
Several things seem clear from this Howland situation. First, the force behind the switch from Jarvis to Howland was the Bureau of Air Commerce, or more specifically, Eugene Vidal. The Miller mentioned in the message to Black on 7 December was William T. Miller, the Superintendent of Airways of the Bureau of Air Commerce. Miller was the man approaching the WPA; Campbell, of Air Commerce, was in charge of the runway construction; and Black, the Interior Department's field representative, had no idea of the reason for the switch from Jarvis to Howland until late December when Campbell explained the situation to him. Secondly, it is clear that neither the Army nor the Navy had initiated the Howland project. The Army had offered Black some obsolete equipment for the Jarvis project and they cooperated in carrying out the new project. The Navy had not been involved at all. It was not until 28 December that the Navy inquired of the Interior Department about the Howland project and, as a result, the Navy was invited at the last moment to send an observer on the expedition. Thirdly, it is clear that Miss Earhart had been counting on using Howland from the beginning. It was the key to her equatorial route and she stated this in a letter to President Roosevelt in January 1937. Howland had been her original route and all others were alternates.
By March 1937, both the Howland field and Miss Earhart were ready. The Navy became involved at this point by agreeing to provide two plane guard vessels, one halfway between Honolulu and Howland and the other halfway between Howland and Lae, New Guinea. In addition, the Navy sent two mechanics to Howland to service Miss Earhart's plane upon its arrival. The Coast Guard agreed to carry Miss Earhart's supplies to Howland and to have its cutter serve as a plane guard at Howland. With all in readiness, Miss Earhart started her world flight attempt. Unfortunately, on 20 March, she cracked up at Honolulu. Undaunted, she had her plane shipped back to California for repairs and she began her second attempt.
Looking back at this first attempt, it is impossible to find any evidence of a special government mission. Miss Earhart selected Howland as the key to her equatorial route and Eugene Vidal provided the key. It is interesting to note that Mr. Vidal resigned as Director of the Bureau of Air Commerce on 1 March, a few weeks before Miss Earhart made her attempt. Vidal visited her in California and there were reports in the newspapers that Vidal and the Putnams would join in a commercial aviation venture. In April, after the failure of the first attempt, Putnam was interviewed in New York City and the conclusion drawn from the interview was that the Putnams, Vidal, and Floyd Odlum of the Atlas Corporation (husband of the famed aviatrix Jacqueline Cochrane) were planning to set up a transatlantic air service.
But, commercial interests aside, only latterday cynics-to whom "spying" and “stupidity” are synonymous-would believe that the government could have been sponsoring, officially or unofficially, a secret Earhart mission. Not even the most bumbling bureaucrat would have contrived a scheme, the success or failure of which literally hinged on the WPA in general and a broken road scraper blade in particular. For, at one point in January, the scheduled departure of the expedition was threatened owing to a lack of funds, since the WPA appropriation had not yet received funds to “repair blade for condemned grader.” A condemned grader?
Furthermore, amateur sleuths argue that the fact that Miss Earhart twice appealed to President Roosevelt for help in preparing for her first attempt indicates that the government was involved in the flight. The first appeal, as we have seen, was a request for help on the Tokyo route-the route that she did not use-and the President's involvement consisted of passing it along to the Navy with the comment that they should see what they could do for her. As it was, the Navy had already contacted Miss Earhart and told her that they would cooperate. The second appeal to the President concerned the delay in obtaining the final approval of the WPA appropriation. Her message was intended to get the funds approved on 8 January, but the final signing of the appropriation did not take place until 11 January. Black had already been told that that was the date on which it would be signed. The interesting point here is that Black had informed the Interior Department of the problem on 7 January and Miss Earhart, in California, knew about it that night. She probably had been told by William Miller of the Bureau of Air Commerce who was acting as her liaison man in Washington with the other government agencies. Finally, it is clear that, if Howland had not been ready, Miss Earhart had been willing to risk the long flight to Tokyo.
By mid-May, the Electra had been repaired and Miss Earhart was ready for her second attempt, but this time the route would go from west to east instead of east to west. The reason for the change in route, as Miss Earhart informed the State Department, the newspapers, and the Navy, was that average weather conditions in the Caribbean and Africa in late June and early July were considered to be unfavorable to the flight. Hence, a decision had been made to fly these areas first.
There are literary bloodhounds, baying loudly as they sniff the 33-year-old trail, who would have us believe that Miss Earhart and her navigator, Frederick Noonan, were now on a double mission-not only to prove the military value of Howland but also to photograph Truk. If one of the objects of this flight was to photograph Truk, this reversal of the route direction set up the worst possible route because most of the permissions from foreign governments obtained by the State Department specifically prohibited the carrying of aerial cameras and some even prohibited the carrying of unsealed hand cameras. To hold that Miss Earhart carried aerial cameras to Truk would involve belief in either a monstrous deceit on the part of the United States or a conspiracy to photograph the island of Truk involving not only the United States, but Venezuela, Brazil, England, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Burma, Siam, and Australia as well.
At each of her stops outside the United States, Miss Earhart's plane was serviced by local people. On overnight stops, she spent the night away from the plane. In Africa and Asia, the plane was checked and fumigated by health officials. Customs inspectors had their tasks to perform. The plane was overhauled at Karachi; much work was done on it at Bandoeng, Dutch East Indies; and a good deal of work was done on the plane at Lae, New Guinea.
One of the major points used to tie Miss Earhart to a government mission was her association with William T. Miller of the Bureau of Air Commerce, who was also a lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve. Miller had been made the liaison man for Miss Earhart with the other government agencies. It has been suggested that Miller was the agent through whom the government prepared and ran the spy mission. Actually, Miller had been assigned as go-between at the time of the switch to Howland for he was familiar with Howland, having been in charge of the islands from March 1935 until March 1936. He had also helped the Interior Department in their takeover of the islands in June 1936 by training Black.
Until the beginning of October, Miller had been working with Black on the islands. It was Miller who had marked out the possible runways on Howland, and he was a natural choice to work with Earhart on the Howland segment of the route. But Miller did not work on the plans for Earhart's second flight for he was not in the United States. The claim is advanced that he did work on the second flight and that, prior to the second attempt, he was ordered to Port Darwin, Australia, to meet Miss Earhart. The obvious implication is that it was at Port Darwin that the last preparations were made for the mission to Truk. The truth is that Miller was ordered to New Zealand and Australia on 16 March prior to Miss Earhart's first attempt and that he left the United States at the end of March just as Miss Earhart returned to start her second effort. He did not meet her at Port Darwin-he was back in the United States at the time that she reached Port Darwin. Miller's trip to New Zealand and Australia had nothing to do with Earhart. He was under orders to investigate the potential volume of mail and business that could be anticipated if the projected Pan American Airways route to New Zealand was approved by the American government.
Miss Earhart began her second attempt from Miami on 1 June and she successfully hopped through the Caribbean to Brazil and then across the Atlantic to Dakar. She continued in short stages across Africa and then leaped across the bottom of Asia. Late in June she arrived in the Dutch East Indies. Here she encountered mechanical trouble so that it was not until 28 June that she flew into Port Darwin, Australia. Here, it is claimed, she met Miller and spent two days getting ready for the real mission of her flight. A suspicious finger is pointed at the explanation for her stay-over that she was held up by an incorrect health certificate. Also, it is pointed out that her radio equipment was checked and found to be in perfect condition. Therefore Port Darwin is a key element in the spy mission.
Miller, as already stated, was not at Port Darwin on 28 June, but back in the United States. Miss Earhart did not stay two days at Port Darwin but left for Lae, New Guinea, the next day, 29 June. Miss Earhart and Fred Noonan were held at Port Darwin in a technical state of quarantine for ten hours because the smallpox certificate they presented was signed by a private American physician instead of by a public health official as required under Australian regulations. The technical quarantine did not interfere with Miss Earhart's plans for they were able to obtain special clearance that night and were able to leave on time on 29 June for Lae. When Miss Earhart arrived at Port Darwin airport, she was asked why she had not used the station's radio direction finder facilities and she told the officials that her direction finder was not working. Army Sergeant Stan Rose checked her direction finder and discovered that a fuse had blown. After replacing the fuse, the set worked satisfactorily and Miss Earhart was advised that, in the event of future trouble, she might check the fuse first. But Miss Earhart's radio equipment was not checked out, only her direction finder. Thus, the mystery of Port Darwin is not a mystery at all.
From Lae, on 2 July at 1000 local time, 0000 Greenwich Central Time, Miss Earhart took off for Howland. In order to hold that she did go on a mission to Truk, it is essential to reject the one position report that she supposedly gave during her flight, and to claim that she maintained radio silence during the approach to, and the flight from, Truk. One claim would have it that she did not use her radio until she believed that she was close enough to Howland and, because she was coming toward How land from the northwest, from Truk, she could not give a position report. The controversial position report supposedly was made at 1720 Lae time or 0720 GCT, seven hours and twenty minutes after she had taken off from Lae. The report placed her some 800 miles out from Lae, averaging about 111 knots. It is because of the low speed that she was making that the message is regarded as fraudulent. Instead, it has been pointed to by one author as a cover to hide the fact that Miss Earhart maintained radio silence because of her mission to Truk.
Yet, the position report is contained in the Coast Guard cutter Itasca's radio log, and it was listed in the Estimate of the Situation report drawn up by the USS Lexington in preparing for its search. The strongest proof of its validity, however, is the report of J. A. Collopy, the District Superintendent at Lae who was at Lae during the whole time of Earhart's stay.
. . . it is very apparent that the weak link in the combination was the crew's lack of expert knowledge of radio. Their Morse was very slow and they preferred to use telephony as much as possible. Balfour [Lae's radio operator] stated that they advised him they would change the wave length at nightfall. Balfour advised them just before nightfall not to change as their signals were coming through quite strong. They apparently changed however as Balfour never heard them again. At about three p.m. a message came through to the effect that they were at 10,000 feet but were going to reduce altitude because of thick banks of cumulus clouds. The next and last message was to the effect that they were at 7,000 feet and making 150 knots, this message was received at approx. 5 p.m.
Miss Earhart, therefore, had been in contact with Lae up to 1720 Lae time (0720 GCT) and she was not maintaining radio silence. Her last report also indicated that she was doing 150 knots which was approximately her plane's cruising speed.
At 1630 Sydney time (which was the same as Lae's), which would be 0630 GCT, Miss Earhart's voice was picked up by the radio station on Nauru Island and for the next five hours, up until2130 Sydney time (1130 GCT), Nauru Island continued to hear her signals. At 2030 Sydney time (1030 GCT), Nauru Island heard Earhart report "a ship in sight ahead" at which time they (Nauru) felt that Earhart must have been at least 60 miles south of Nauru. The ship sighted was the British steamer Myrtlebank which arrived at Nauru Island at daybreak. Therefore, from 0000 GCT to 1130 GCT, Earhart had been in contact with Lae or had been heard by Nauru radio.
Miss Earhart was first heard by the Coast Guard cutter Itasca (WPG-321) on plane guard duty at Howland at 0248 Howland Island time (1418 GCT) - two-and-three-quarter hours after Nauru lost contact with her. Between the time of her takeoff from Lae at 0000 GCT and her last contact with the Itasca at approximately 0845 Howland time (2015 GCT), a total of some 20 hours and 15 minutes elapsed and Miss Earhart was heard for all but two and three-quarter hours. She was not maintaining radio silence as has been maintained and she was flying directly to Howland.
If there is any mystery at all to the Earhart flight, it would seem to be the scientific mission she was conducting. For someone who was testing modern long-distance aviation equipment, she seemed to have little knowledge of its uses. The direction finder at Port Darwin is a prime example. She herself mentions the casual way chat she and Noonan collected air specimens during the flight. At one point in her trip, when flying the Atlantic to Dakar, she commented that she broadcast at her stated intervals-but did not really expect anyone to hear her. As Collopy and the commander of the Itasca were both to note, Miss Earhart was not well versed in radio communications on which the flight ultimately depended.
And there is the mystery of the USS Ontario. The Ontario was on plane guard duty at the midpoint of the Lae-Howland route at approximately 3° South Latitude, 165° East Longitude. Yet, there is no report of Earhart contacting the Ontario or of the Ontario hearing her. The Itasca contacted Tutuila Naval Radio at Samoa at 0036 Howland time, which would be 1206 GCT, asking if the Ontario had heard from Earhart and the Itasca was given a negative answer. Yet, this was an hour and a half after Nauru radio had heard Earhart report she had sighted a ship. The Myrtlebank's approximate position at the time she was sighted was reported as 1° 40' South Latitude and 166° 45' Ease Longitude. Miss Earhart was already beyond the Ontario at 1030 GCT. If she was supposed to fly over the Ontario, this would mean chat she was north of her intended flight line and, if this was not corrected, she would end up well north of Howland.
At all events, it is impossible to hold chat Miss Earhart had carried out a spy mission over Truk. What was her mission? She was after publicity. She claimed chat she was flying the world because "I want to" and to show that women could do things as well as, if not better than, men. She herself stated in her flight log that she "more-or-less mortgaged the future" for the second attempt. Clearly, she expected to gain something from the flight. Putnam twice sent radio messages to Howland, shortly before Miss Earhart was expected to arrive there, asking that Miss Earhart be informed of radio commitments that Putnam had lined up for her at Honolulu and California if she could reach there by a certain time.
While preparing for her second attempt, on 16 April, Miss Earhart had signed a contract with Harcourt, Brace, and Company to write the story of the flight. It was because of this chat Miss Earhart kept a log or diary of the flight. Periodically, her notes were mailed back to the United States. Miss Earhart was also acting as a special correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune, reporting on the progress of her flight. The plane carried a cargo of stamp covers which had brought in about $25,000 to the Putnams. Finally, Miss Earhart, herself, while preparing for the second attempt, had referred to her flight as a "stunt flight." Taken all in all, there can be no doubt chat the Earhart mission was designed to increase the prestige of the Putnams and co use the resultant publicity to enhance the new commercial venture they planned to participate in at the end of the flight.
This paper does not attempt to offer an explanation of what happened to Miss Earhart and Fred Noonan after they failed to arrive at Howland. It would seem logical to point out chat, if Miss Earhart had been flying at her cruising speed along the route, she would have exhausted her fuel supply shortly after her last contact with the Itasca and would have crashed into the sea. It has been claimed that she had enough fuel to turn back after failing to find Howland and that she then attempted to reach the Gilberts. And because she was off course, instead of reaching the Gilberts, she landed in the Japanese Mandates. Here she was captured by the Japanese and eventually died while being held by the Japanese on Saipan Island. This possibility, no matter how unlikely, cannot be discounted.
It must be pointed out, however, that some of the proof offered to sustain this claim is suspect. For instance, the claim is given some substance by quoting a Navy message chat Nauru Island picked up Miss Earhart at 1030 the day of her disappearance saying "Land in sight ahead." Obviously, this is a garbled report of the actual Nauru contact of "A ship in sight ahead" which was picked up at 1030 GCT the night before. Consul Doyle at Sydney, in reporting the Nauru contacts, made no mention of such a message from Nauru.
The claim is made that the Marine Corps was involved in the Earhart mystery. One witness claims that he overheard Marine officers on Saipan talking about the discovery of Miss Earhart's plane at Aslito airfield and that the next night he was present when the plane was deliberately destroyed by the Marines. There is no mention of a date with this testimony, although the witness is identified as being a member of an Army Postal Unit stationed on Saipan in 1945. Aslito airfield was captured on 18 June 1944 by units of the Army's 165th Infantry, 27th Division, and the 165th Infantry used the field as a command post until 22 June, when the field became operational for Army Air Force units. The combat photographic history of this regiment shows Aslito airfield in the period 18-22 June and the most notable feature in the photographs is the skeletonized condition of the hangars. Nothing as big as a plane could have been hidden in them. It would have been in clear view of everyone. On 22 June, units of the 318th Fighter Group of the Army Air Force arrived at the airfield and were based there during the fight for the islands. If the Earhart plane had been there, it would have had to have been identified and destroyed during the four nights from 18-21 June, for after that time the Air Force would have been in charge of the hangars. Yet, during those nights, the Army's 165th Regiment-and not the Marines'-was there. During this period, the Second Marine Division, which was the group named by the witness, was in heavy action driving up the Saipan coast and away from Aslito airfield. On top of all this, the witness is definitely identified as being on Saipan in 1945, not in 1944 at the time of the capture of Saipan.
To back up the claim that Miss Earhart was on Saipan, we are told of the capture of a Japanese soldier, a member of the 118th Regiment, on Saipan who had a snapshot of Miss Earhart. Under interrogation he supposedly admitted that Miss Earhart had been held on Saipan until her death. Yet, the Marine Corps history of the battle lists the 118th Regiment as one which had been sent as reinforcement for Saipan and had landed in early June, just prior to the invasion.
One of the photographs in the 165th Infantry's Combat Record shows six Catholic nuns and two Catholic clerics who were rescued during the invasion. The two clerics were a Jesuit priest, Father Tardio, and a Jesuit brother, Brother Gregorio Oroquieta. A request was made to Father Tardio's Province House that his records be checked for any mention of Americans on Saipan prior to the war. The records available were checked but no mention was found of any Americans being on Saipan. The answer did provide the address of the mother house of the nuns who had been on Saipan. In reply to a letter to the mother house, information was obtained that three of the six nuns are still alive in Spain and a fourth is still at her post in Saipan. The records of the mission that had been returned to Spain were examined and no mention was found of any Americans on Saipan prior to the war. One of the Sisters now in Spain was asked about the presence of two Americans, one of whom was a woman, and she stated that she "did not hear anything about the two Americans and she added that if two Americans would have been held in Saipan this fact would have been known to the Sisters. Saipan is very small and Sister said that the Chamorro people and the Sisters had very good relations."
Finally, there seems to have been a tendency for the Navy to play tricks on those seeking to prove a spy mission. For instance, it was suggested to one writer that the radio logs of the Gold Star (AG-12), Black Hawk (AD-9), Chaumont (AP-5), and Henderson (AP-1) might be checked for interesting information. In July 1937, the Blackhawk was at Chinwangtao in northern China, the Chaumont was at Shanghai on 11 July, the Gold Star was on her way from Guam to Manila on 7 July, and the Henderson arrived at Norfolk Naval Shipyard for overhaul on 8 June and did not leave until 7 August. The radio logs of these ships could be searched for interesting information but it did not necessarily follow that it would be found. At another point, the same writer was told that a retired Marine general was ready to tell all about Earhart but, after the writer travelled across the United States, the general refused to talk. Then, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz is reported to have passed along to the same author his own assurances that the author was onto something which “will stagger your imagination.” Since Miss Earhart was not on a spy mission or any mission for the American government and her disappearance had nothing to do with starting World War II, what could stagger one's imagination? Even if she had been on a spy mission in 1937, that would hardly stagger one's imagination in 1966 or 1969.
Miss Earhart was no flying spy. She did not have a mission, government or otherwise, but she did have a motivation. It was the same motivation that impelled both the suffragettes before her and today's members of the Women's Liberation Movement. She, as well as they, needed to be in the public eye. For, in America 1937 as in America 1970, all things are possible with publicity, but without it, very little is.