The evolution of Wayne Rooney in ten chapters

Chapter 1: a generational striking talent, 2002-04

The buzz around Wayne Rooney had started long before his Premier League bow against Tottenham Hotspur at the beginning of the 2002-03 campaign. Seasoned observers of Everton’s academy sides were extolling the virtues of a generational striking talent who was breaking all kinds of records for the club’s youth teams.

After scoring eight goals in eight games on the way to the 2001-02 FA Youth Cup final — including a stunner from long-range at White Hart Lane in the semi-final — Rooney was named on the bench by David Moyes for the Premier League trip to Southampton in April 2002, and handed the No 18 shirt previously worn by one of his idols, Paul Gascoigne.

An unused substitute that day, Rooney then gave Everton fans their first real glimpse of his potential in the first leg of the Youth Cup final against Aston Villa, scoring a poacher’s header at the back post to reveal the famous “once a blue always a blue” t-shirt, and impressing with his speed and all-round game in an otherwise disappointing 4-1 loss.

By 16, Rooney already had the physical attributes to compete in the men’s game and the technique to go with it.

(Photo: John Walton/EMPICS via Getty Images)

His breakthrough came at the start of the next campaign when he partnered Kevin Campbell in David Moyes’ 4-4-2 system. Unlike Campbell, who played on the shoulder of the final defender and was known for his penalty-box prowess, Rooney was afforded the luxury to drift in a freer role, making use of his ability to receive possession between the lines and drive at defenders. Rarely did he score tap-ins; instead, he had a penchant for the spectacular, as evidenced by his famous long-range winner in the 2-1 victory over Arsenal that October, and the superb solo effort at Elland Road a month later.

The first of 2️⃣0️⃣3️⃣#EVEARS is a fixture that saw Wayne Rooney score his first-ever #PL goal 👀 pic.twitter.com/0m4OdZ4Wi6

— Premier League (@premierleague) December 21, 2019

Rooney was never an out-and-out No 9 at Everton — his tally of 17 goals in 77 games demonstrates that — but he was always good enough to perform such a role if required. It was felt that his skills, honed on the streets of north Liverpool, were better suited to that of a second striker — part-creator, part-goalscorer. In his second campaign, he often played off Duncan Ferguson, one of his teenage idols, and later behind the speedy Tomasz Radzinski.

Everton fans didn’t see the best of Rooney, who left in acrimonious circumstances to join Manchester United in 2004. But it was on Merseyside that the foundations were laid for what was to come and it was while an Everton player that Rooney produced his best performances at an international tournament.

The Euro 2004 build-up was dominated by discussion about England’s optimum system. Sven-Goran Eriksson initially wanted to play a midfield diamond, then reverted to a 4-4-2 after the players weren’t convinced by the new formation — but relatively little attention was paid to the situation up front. Here, Rooney had emerged as the the obvious choice to play alongside Michael Owen.

Chapter 2: a top-class second striker, 2004-06

Owen and Rooney formed a curious strike partnership. Owen had become accustomed to playing off a ‘big’ No 9 like Emile Heskey but Rooney offered a very different option. He took the No 9 shirt but played off Owen as a second striker, starting in a slightly deeper position before running in behind Owen and through on goal. Owen was leading the line but Rooney was certainly leading the goalscoring charge. He finished Euro 2004 with four goals in four matches, whereas Owen netted just one of England’s 10 goals in Portugal.

Rooney’s final goal at that tournament, in the 4-2 win over Croatia, summed up their relationship. Rooney collected the ball between the lines and drove at the Croatian defence. Owen, as he did throughout his career, lingered on verge of the offside line, awaiting a through ball. Rooney had other ideas, though, playing the ball just behind Owen, forcing him to retreat and then hooking a return pass in behind the defence for Rooney, who was running through to finish calmly. Rooney was starting moves and finishing them while Owen had been relegated to playing the wall passes.

🗣️ "I don't remember anyone making such an impact on a tournament since Pelé."

🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿🆚🇭🇷 Wayne Rooney against Croatia at EURO 2004 🔥#EURO2020 | @England pic.twitter.com/Bh5Mzpqcfd

— UEFA EURO 2020 (@EURO2020) November 30, 2019

In an Everton shirt, he looked promising, whereas in an England shirt, he already seemed world-class, and those performances convinced Manchester United to make him the most expensive teenager in British football history at the time. His first couple of seasons at Old Trafford were relatively low-key — United weren’t able to compete with Jose Mourinho’s Chelsea and Rooney again occupied the position of second striker, wearing the No 8 shirt.

Rooney’s issue here, however, was that he wasn’t playing behind a particularly cooperative centre-forward. Ruud van Nistelrooy was the Premier League’s most clinical finisher, and had been accustomed to Manchester United’s attacking play being based solely around him. Others were tasked with putting the ball into the right areas and Van Nistelrooy was always on hand to finish. The arrival of Cristiano Ronaldo and Rooney changed things — these weren’t primarily providers like David Beckham, Paul Scholes and Ryan Giggs. They were players who wanted to score goals.

Rooney completes his hat-trick on his Champions League debut against Fenerbahce (Photo: Paul Barker/AFP via Getty Images)

During his first campaign at United, Rooney was a scorer of great goals rather than a great goalscorer. Eleven goals and two assists is no more than a decent return but he won Match of the Day’s goal of the season award for a volley against Middlesbrough, which arguably isn’t even his best volley of the season, with his stupendous effort against Newcastle probably more memorable.

He improved in his second campaign — but, crucially, often looked better when Van Nistelrooy was omitted from the side.

“Ruud isn’t happy. I think he knows his time at United is coming to an end and that the style of football we’re playing isn’t suited to him,” Rooney recalled in his diary, “My Decade In The Premier League”. “He’s still an amazing goalscorer but the players the manager has brought in are more geared to playing quick, counter-attacking football… I’ve had the feeling that he’s been unhappy from the minute I signed for Manchester United.”

Van Nistelrooy was being eased out and Rooney’s role was about to change.

Chapter 3: waiting in the wings, 2006-09

The era of Ronaldo and Rooney dominating Manchester United’s attack started, improbably, after a summer where England’s exit from the World Cup was hastened by Rooney being sent off against Portugal for stamping on Ricardo Carvalho, which Ronaldo did his best to draw attention to, prompting Rooney to shove him shortly before the red card was brandished. Ronaldo winked at the Portugal bench afterwards — job done. United’s two stars were seemingly at war.

Happily for United, the two settled their differences shortly afterwards and both arrived for pre-season ready to shine. Sir Alex Ferguson hadn’t signed an obvious replacement for Van Nistelrooy — United were to play with multiple rotating attackers, surprising the opposition with speed, movement and interplay.

There was little doubt, however, that Ronaldo was the main man. United’s attackers didn’t have defined positions during this period but it was obvious that Ronaldo had first dibs on his role. “He will find the weakness in the back four,” explained Gary Neville in a newspaper column after his retirement. “If he’s not getting the left-back in the first 15 minutes, he’ll switch to the right-back. If he’s not getting the right-back, he’ll switch to the left centre-back. He’ll find someone in your back four who is weak and doesn’t like defending one-on-one and against pace and power.”

Ferguson’s decision to make Ronaldo his focus was fully justified. After a barren three-year period, United won three straight titles, won the European Cup and reached another final and Ronaldo became, until the rise of Lionel Messi, unquestionably the world’s best footballer.

But this meant Rooney having to wait in the wings — often quite literally. In big matches, particularly in Europe, Rooney was handed a wide role in United’s 4-5-1 formation, replicating the job Park Ji-sung was playing on the opposite wing by manfully tracking opposition full-backs up and down the pitch. This was the period of defensive wingers and Rooney had, like Joe Cole before him, gone from a brilliant box of tricks into a functional workhorse.

“I don’t mind too much; anything for the team but I’d rather play as a striker,” Rooney admitted. “On the flanks, I can’t express myself in a game in the way that I’d like…legging it up and down the pitch for 90 minutes can be knackering. The annoying thing is, Ronaldo can play on the flanks, it’s his role. But Ronnie’s the best player in the world at the moment and he’s a massive threat up front.”

(Photo: Andrew Yates/AFP via Getty Images)

There were exceptions. Rooney played alone up front in the 2007 FA Cup final, when United struggled to get him into the game in a 1-0 loss to Chelsea, and as part of a strike partnership alongside Carlos Tevez in the following year’s Champions League final against the same opposition. But that match was a good example of Ronaldo’s seniority — Ferguson wanted to get him up against Michael Essien, a plan that worked perfectly for United’s opener, and Rooney was an afterthought.

In the 2-0 loss to Barcelona in the 2009 Champions League final, it was the other way around. Ronaldo was up front, Rooney on the left, because Ferguson wanted Ronaldo sprinting into the channels. Rooney remained a threat but the lack of a permanent position, five years into his United career, was leaving him frustrated.

Chapter 4: the main man, 2009-10

In 2009, Ronaldo departed for Real Madrid. And just like after the departure of Van Nistelrooy, Ferguson didn’t sign a direct replacement. Dimitar Berbatov had arrived the previous summer and was expected to become United’s main striker. Antonio Valencia, a more conventional winger than Ronaldo, arrived to supply the crosses.

The major beneficiary was Rooney, having grown tired of running up and down the flanks. In pre-season, Ferguson told Rooney that he wanted him to get in the box and get on the end of more chances. Rooney responded mischievously. “Do I have to get on the end of my own crosses now?”

Again, Rooney didn’t have a defined position — sometimes he was fielded as a second striker just behind Berbatov and on other occasions, Ferguson switched to 4-3-3, with Rooney fielded up front alone. The difference, though, was that the attack was unashamedly based around Rooney — he was the focal point, rather than having to play around others.

In big matches, Ferguson almost exclusively turned to 4-3-3, with Rooney up front — and this was where he started to look like one of Europe’s best. There were two very distinct elements to his performances when playing up front alone. On one hand, he looked like a proper No 9 and scored an impressive number of headers, generally from right-wing Valencia crosses. On the other hand, at a time when Lionel Messi was popularising the false No 9 role, Rooney proved capable of that too.

And when Rooney brought the two roles together, he seemed unstoppable. One goal, in a 3-1 win away at Arsenal in January 2010 — a strike Rooney considers one of his best — showed his dual role perfectly. Rooney came deep to drag Arsenal’s centre-backs up the pitch, laid the ball off to Nani, and then sprinted 70 yards into the space he’d created to sweep a first-time finish into the far corner.

(Photo: Matthew Peters/Manchester United via Getty Images)

Rooney ended the campaign with 26 Premier League goals. It was more than his previous two campaigns put together, and 10 more than his previous best. Although he was not always deployed up front, it now seemed his best role. Owen, by this point a United teammate but out of the international reckoning, believed England manager Fabio Capello should have used him up front.

“I strongly believe that he should play for England in the same role as he does in big games for Manchester United,” Owen said. “Wayne used to play in behind, linking play, spraying the ball about, feeding the wide men and releasing the striker…(now) he’s running in behind defenders, getting the ball, beating players and competing for scraps around the keeper and scoring loads with his head. It’s a total change to what we’ve all seen for so many years. To adapt so quickly and effectively shows Wayne for what he is — world-class. It’s really been a masterstroke by Sir Alex.”

Chapter 5: a proper No 10, 2010-12

Capello, who jettisoned Owen from his England side, didn’t heed his advice about Rooney. He was instead fielded just off Heskey or Jermain Defoe as England performed awfully at World Cup 2010, with Rooney desperately struggling to impact games.

Rooney returned to United and endured a difficult start to 2010-11, including ankle injuries and his very public declaration that he wanted to leave United. On the pitch, he was often paired with Berbatov, sometimes playing the more advanced striking position while the Bulgarian linked play together deeper, although they often rotate positions.

Berbatov endured a curious campaign, topping the Premier League’s goalscoring charts yet being omitted from United’s 18-man squad for the Champions League final. Ferguson had instead turned to a new system, effectively a 4-4-1-1 with Rooney behind Javier Hernandez, a one-dimensional striker who could only really sprint in behind the defence. Rooney was now playing as a more defined No 10, charged with playing through-balls for the little Mexican.

(Photo: Martin Rickett/PA Images via Getty Images)

Rio Ferdinand, his United team-mate, suggested Rooney wanted to return to that role, in an exchange he outlined in his autobiography. “Wayne says, ‘I want to play No 10′. I said to him, ‘You’ve just had your best year statistically and in terms of adulation and the media loving you. Why do you want to play No 10?’… I just couldn’t understand it. For me, his best position is No 9.”

This proved problematic in that Champions League final against Barcelona, however. Rooney offered an attacking threat from that position — and his equaliser was excellent — but he also cost Manchester United when they didn’t have possession, which is the vast majority of the time. His failure to track Sergio Busquets meant that United were constantly overrun in midfield and never truly competed. They were, in fairness, up against the most celebrated side of his era, and struggled in other areas across the pitch too.

But Rooney’s defensive deficiencies started to become a concern. The following season, 2011-12, Rooney was almost exclusively fielded as a No 10 behind Hernandez or Danny Welbeck. He enjoyed his best-ever goalscoring campaign, netting 27 times, although his all-round contribution in terms of build-up play and influencing the midfield battle was more minimal.

Crucially, he started to become regarded as a liability without possession, which feels remarkable considering he was once renowned for his defensive diligence when playing wide. Ferguson started to make decisions for big games based upon Rooney’s inability to contribute defensively. For what turned out to be a title-decider away at Manchester City, a 1-0 loss, Rooney was moved to a lone centre-forward role, where he’d barely played all season, because Park’s energy was required in the No 10 role. Park, however, couldn’t link play and United were dreadful.

England’s Euro 2012 exit also proved significant. Although their quarter-final defeat to Italy was only on penalties, England were utterly outplayed by Italy and, in particular, by Andrea Pirlo. Rooney was clearly tasked with marking him — he spent the game half-heartedly jogging towards him, and at one point, goalkeeper Joe Hart could be overheard screaming at Rooney to mark him more strictly. In an age where the midfield was king, and forwards were expected to contribute heavily without the ball, Rooney’s defensively shortcomings as a No 10 were starting to become a major issue.

(Photo: Owen Humphreys/PA Images via Getty Images)

Chapter 6: the deep-lying goalscorer, 2012-14

Those shortcomings were precisely why Ferguson decided to sign a new No 10. Having been wowed by Shinji Kagawa’s performances for Dortmund as an energetic, counter-attacking, disciplined No 10, Ferguson brought him to Manchester United in the summer of 2012. It was widely expected that Kagawa would play in that No 10 role, with Rooney returning to his position up front.

It made sense — Rooney had, after all, scored 27 Premier League goals the previous season from that No 10 role, and neither Hernandez nor Welbeck were quite prolific enough to lead the line. United started the season with Kagawa just behind Rooney.

But the plan changed dramatically. Perhaps knowing that he was entering his final season in management, Ferguson couldn’t resist splurging on Robin van Persie, who was fresh from winning the Golden Boot for Arsenal. This wasn’t a long-term signing: Van Persie was 29 and had a history of injury problems. But for a single season, he was unstoppable and effectively won Manchester United the title.

Ferguson tried to cram Kagawa, Rooney and Van Persie into the same side, briefly experimenting with an uncharacteristic midfield diamond. But he eventually turned to 4-4-2 with Rooney just behind Van Persie, a partnership that memorably sealed the title when Rooney’s long-range pass over the defence allowed the Dutchman to volley home against Aston Villa.

Robin van Persie with one of the great #PL goals 🔥#PLKickOff in only 5️⃣ days!!! pic.twitter.com/KVV2Xgw24t

— Premier League (@premierleague) August 7, 2017

United often looked shambolic in midfield, however, completely failing to control matches. When they encountered top-level European opposition, Ferguson couldn’t risk playing Rooney as the No 10 — he simply didn’t offer enough without possession. For the tie with Real Madrid, which proved to be Ferguson’s last in Europe, he dropped Rooney, a move generally prefixed with the word “sensationally” in the British press.

But it wasn’t a sensational decision — it was an entirely logical decision. Ferguson needed someone who could be trusted in a defensive sense. “He understood the reasons for not playing him and that was completely tactical,” Ferguson said. “And I think I was right — Danny Welbeck is the best player we have in terms of operating in a double role. We had to choke Xabi Alonso’s ability to control the game, which Danny did, and that took away Alonso’s control.” Ferguson remembered how Rooney had let the likes of Busquets and Pirlo run riot, and he couldn’t allow that to happen again.

After Ferguson’s retirement, David Moyes’ reign wasn’t good for anyone at Manchester United. He broadly continued with the Ferguson approach, with Rooney behind Van Persie. Rooney wasn’t particularly convincing in terms of his all-round game but did manage 17 Premier League goals. And this would be the Rooney of the next couple of years — his goalscoring ability, rather than his overall contribution, justifying his place as the No 10. It was the same story for England. In late 2013, Rooney became his country’s all-time leading goalscorer, and yet there was a sense he was holding back his side. Many supporters would have happily seen him dropped.

England opened their World Cup 2014 campaign against Italy, the side who had eliminated them from the previous international tournament. Roy Hodgson couldn’t afford to give Rooney the task of tracking Pirlo again, so instead handed that No 10 role to Raheem Sterling, considered a more disciplined player even at the age of 19. Rooney instead played from the left — and Italy dominated the game from that flank. England were moving Rooney around to make him less of a problem but in reality, they were just moving the problem around too.

Chapter 7: positional confusion, 2014-17

In the Louis van Gaal era, it was difficult to know what Rooney was. Sometimes, he was deployed up front. Sometimes, he was fielded in midfield — at times, with midfielder Angel Di Maria deployed as a striker. Rooney spread play effectively from his deeper role but lacked the mobility to get around the pitch.

This became apparent a month into Van Gaal’s reign, when Rooney found himself so unable to keep up with West Ham’s Stewart Downing, embarking on a counter-attacking run, that he launched himself into such a hopelessly wild challenge that he was shown a straight red card. Rooney’s positional sense as a midfielder never convinced.

And yet somehow, Rooney found himself deployed in midfield by Hodgson at Euro 2016, too. Throughout qualification, Rooney had been either up front or as No 10 and had essentially done his usual — scored goals without contributing much to all-round play. For some reason, shortly before the tournament started, Hodgson decided to change system entirely, moving to a 4-3-3 featuring Rooney and Dele Alli as midfielders behind a front three of Sterling, Harry Kane and Adam Lallana (or, in the fateful loss to Iceland, Daniel Sturridge). It was an absurdly attacking side that lacked midfield control and Rooney was unable to bring that authority or guile in possession — his passing was slow and predictable.

Despite his poor performances for England, Rooney was seemingly both undroppable and exempt from positional instructions. In his sole game in charge of England, Hodgson’s successor Sam Allardyce started with Rooney in that left-of-centre midfield role he’d unconvincingly played at the Euros before Rooney moved into a No 10 role after half-time. Was that a deliberate tactical move from Allardyce? It seemed not.

(Photo: Dan Mullan/Getty Images)

“Wayne played wherever he wanted,” Allardyce explained afterwards. “He was brilliant and controlled midfield. I can’t stop Wayne playing there. This is the most decorated outfield player in England. He’s won everything at Manchester United, at Champions League and domestic level. I think he holds a lot more experience at international football than I do as an international manager. So, when he is using his experience and playing as a team member, it’s not for me to say where he’s going to play.”

This was an incredible act of deference to a player who was struggling to work out his optimum position. Many hoped Allardyce would bring an end to Rooney’s international career — instead, he was giving him more freedom than ever. England were lucky that Allardyce only lasted a single game.

In Rooney’s final season at Manchester United, under Jose Mourinho, the focus was on goals — specifically, when he would break Bobby Charlton’s all-time goalscoring record for Manchester United. He eventually did so in January 2017, and finished four ahead of Charlton eventually, on 253.

Rooney wasn’t a first-team regular at United, however, and elected to leave the club at the end of the season. There was little debate about where he would head next — back to Everton. There was, though, still a debate about which position he should play.

Chapter 8: Different club, same problems, 2017-18

Upon his return to Goodison Park, Rooney was a vastly different entity to the “street footballer” that had left for Manchester United in 2004. Gone was the rapid acceleration to take him away from defenders and in its place, a more cerebral style of play focused on touch and intelligent movement.

His arrival on a free transfer struck an emotional chord with sections of the Goodison fanbase but from a footballing perspective, he was also considered part of the solution in terms of goals, to compensate for Romelu Lukaku’s move in the opposite direction.

In a bizarre summer of spending, Rooney was joined by club-record signing Gylfi Sigurdsson and Davy Klaassen, both of whom were also considered options for the No 10 role, as manager Ronald Koeman looked to spread goals across the side. Instead, this simply led to confusion tactically and a one-paced forward line.

Rooney was initially the favoured option in the No 10 role, scoring a fairytale goal on his second league bow at Goodison against Stoke, with Sigurdsson often shunted to the left to accommodate him. Blessed with an abundance of No 10s but no obvious Lukaku replacement, Koeman’s side lacked balance and results were disastrous. The Dutchman’s sacking in October 2017, and the arrival of Allardyce — him again — had a crucial impact on Rooney’s positional deployment.

(Photo: Tony McArdle/Everton FC via Getty Images)

Despite a healthy goal return, it was considered that Rooney was stopping £45 million signing Sigurdsson from flourishing in his best position. He was therefore moved backwards into central midfield, the idea being to provide Everton with another ball-playing option from deep, utilising Rooney’s expansive passing range.

The early signs were positive. After the 2-0 home win against Brighton in March, Allardyce suggested that Rooney had “mastered” his central midfield sitting role. “I thought he was our prompter,” Allardyce marvelled. “He kept the ball moving and getting it forward, and kept the flow of the attacks going.”

Everton quickly moved out of relegation danger but Rooney had become the elephant in the room, with Allardyce vocal about his “struggles against top opposition”. Rooney became seen as a luxury on high wages, and another parting of ways seemed inevitable.

After he departed Goodison Park after a single season back, Rooney admitted his positional change had been a bone of contention and claimed it led to his demise at his boyhood club.

“I started off playing as a striker and then the team wasn’t doing well,” he explained. “Almost through my own fault speaking with the manager, we both felt it would be better if I went into a midfield role and tried to help us get control of games when really, I should have turned round and said, ‘No, I want to be up top scoring goals’ — which I did in the first half of the season.”

Chapter 9: No 9 in MLS, 2018-19

After those comments, it was no surprise to see Rooney fielded up front after his move to Major League Soccer in 2018. Whereas Allardyce believed the answer to Rooney’s lack of mobility was to bring him deeper, D.C. United manager Ben Olsen had the opposite idea. During his 15-month stint with D.C., Rooney was handed the No 9 shirt and exclusively fielded up front.

Olsen’s primary formation was a 4-2-3-1 and his alternatives were 4-1-4-1 or 5-4-1 — all allowed Rooney to operate as a lone striker, as the focal point of D.C.’s attack. But Rooney was also given freedom to drift into different zones. He constantly surveyed the pitch and chose moments to drop deep, either into a pocket of space between the opposition’s lines or even further into a central midfield position, where he could bring control to the game if his team-mates weren’t moving the ball to his liking. In a sense, it was a return to the false 9 role he occasionally perfected at Manchester United.

As with all forwards who play that role successfully, Rooney provided the opposition with two options. Either they could let Rooney drift unmarked between the lines, allowing him to receive possession, turn and either find a team-mate upfield or drive forward himself. Alternatively, they could stick tight to Rooney, denying him the ability to receive the ball in the first place or preventing him from turning. In this situation, the gaps in the defence were exploited by onrushing midfielders breaking through the back line.

Rooney’s first assist for the club, for Paul Arriola’s fine long-range drive against Vancouver, was a good example and he also proved effective at supplying team-mates with aerial flick-ons, in the mould of an old-school No 9.

(Photo: Tony Quinn/Icon Sportswire via Getty Images)

Defensively, the now 34-year-old Rooney continued to be a problem, although this wasn’t such a big issue as a No 9. He spent most of his time standing — sometimes jogging — up front, waiting for his team-mates to win possession so he could become involved again. In fairness, Rooney certainly wasn’t the only high-profile, ageing ex-Manchester United forward taking this approach in MLS at the time — LA Galaxy’s Zlatan Ibrahimovic did something similar.

And, unlike Ibrahimovic, Rooney brought occasional moments of supreme defensive effort. Back in the summer of 2018 came his standout moment in MLS, when, in a home game against Orlando City with D.C. chasing a winner with their goalkeeper forward from a corner, Rooney sprinted back to make a game-saving tackle before dribbling forward to drift a cross towards the back post, which was headed home by Luciano Acosta, to complete his hat-trick. That was a good example of Rooney’s all-round game; able to tackle and create in the same move.

One year later, this Wayne Rooney chase-down tackle and assist in the 96th minute is still something else 👏 pic.twitter.com/iXbJXnaxgs

— SportsCenter (@SportsCenter) August 12, 2019

Although D.C. were unable to go deep in the play-offs during his time in MLS, it was widely considered that Rooney had brought both technical quality and — more significantly — tactical nuance to a side largely devoid of those qualities before his arrival.

Chapter 10: back to England, and back into midfield, 2020

Fully two months before Wayne Rooney even made his debut at Pride Park, Derby County manager Phillip Cocu was already fielding questions about precisely where the club’s surprise recruit would be deployed. Everything from a centre-forward position to a deep midfield role was mentioned — as ever, Rooney’s optimum position seemed uncertain, and Cocu kept his cards close to his chest.

Eventually, when Rooney made his long-awaited debut in a 2-1 victory over Barnsley in January, he was fielded as a No 10 behind lone striker Jack Marriott. He looked somewhat off the pace as he played his way back into fitness — and, in a sequence that summarised the confusion of the last half-decade, in the second half, he initially played in a more withdrawn midfield role before going up front for the final eight minutes.

Since then, Rooney has been screening the defence in a midfield partnership, next to either the emerging Max Bird, the experienced Tom Huddlestone or the energetic Duane Holmes.

(Photo: Laurence Griffiths/Getty Images)

Rooney has been pulling the strings from deep midfield positions, largely to good effect. Until Rooney’s arrival, Derby lacked someone who could unlock opposition defences — but that’s no longer an issue.

Against Barnsley, Cocu explained afterwards that Derby had found a weakness in their ability to defend diagonal balls and therefore, Rooney rained down upon them with a series of raking passes from one flank to the other, with marauding full-backs Jayden Bogle and Max Lowe the benefactors.

Rooney’s pass map against Barnsley (white: short pass, black: long pass)

It’s an approach they’ve often deployed since, albeit with more variety, and Rooney has been instrumental in Derby’s best attacking moves.

Rooney looks more at home in midfield than ever before — Cocu has experienced better results than his compatriots Van Gaal and Koeman, although it’s fair to say Championship football lacks the intensity of the Premier League.

That’s precisely why Rooney will be relishing the opportunity of facing Manchester United this week, however — not quite showing United what they’re missing but showing them how he has, at last, managed to look at home in midfield.